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Website fingerprinting (WF) is an attack on anonymity systems that affects
browsing privacy. Many research works in the literature have used website fin-
gerprinting to attack internet users with anonymity systems, in particular, Tor
protocol. However, most of the fingerprinting attacks on Tor protocol have been
studied based on dataset generated by a single web browser namely Firefox (Tor
Browser version). In This thesis, a dataset of Tor protocol traffic was collected
using the six popular web browsers, namely Firefox, Chrome, Internet Explorer,
Opera, Safari and Tor Browser. Two feature extraction methods based on edit
distance (ED) and wavelet packet decomposition (WPD) for WF on Tor protocol
were investigated. ED algorithm was used to compute the similarity between the
Tor traffic instances which is then used to train the classifiers. Different classifiers
are applied for our extracted features and the accuracy computed by each classi-
xvii
fier was compared. A new approach based on WPD was applied to our generated
dataset for feature extraction. The WPD was used to extract the approximation
and detail coefficients for Tor packet sizes sequence for each website. An empir-
ical analysis of applying these features for website fingerprinting using a freely
available datasets (Cai dataset) and our datasets has been carried out. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first work in the literature that uses all popu-
lar web browsers to collect the datasets and uses wavelet packet decomposition
method for extracting the features of Tor traffic packet sequences for the website.
The empirical analysis showed promising results which are comparable to similar
work in the literature. This confirms our initial intuitions that WPD method is
suitable for use with website fingerprinting focusing on packet size, packet order
and sequence. Our work also shows the different results of website fingerprinting
with respect to the major web browsers.
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ﻟﻠﻣﻭﺍﻗﻊ ﻭﻫﻣﺎ ﻁﺭﻳﻘﺔ ﺧﻭﺍﺭﺯﻣﻳﺔ ﻣﺳﺎﻓﺔ ﻟﻳﻔﻧﺷﺗﺎﻳﻥ ﻭﻁﺭﻳﻘﺔ  ﺣﺭﻛﺔ ﺍﻹﺭﺳﺎﻝﻣﺧﺗﻠﻔﺗﻳﻥ ﻹﺳﺗﺧﺭﺍﺝ ﺍﻟﻣﻳﺯﺍﺕ ﻭﺍﻟﺳﻣﺎﺕ ﻣﻥ ﺑﻳﺎﻧﺎﺕ 
ﻔﺱ ﺧﻭﺍﺭﺯﻣﻳﺔ ﻣﺳﺎﻓﺔ ﻟﻳﻔﻧﺷﺗﺎﻳﻥ ﻟﺣﺳﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﺗﺷﺎﺑﻪ ﺑﻳﻥ ﻣﺟﻣﻭﻋﺗﻳﻥ ﻣﻥ ﺑﻳﺎﻧﺎﺕ ﺣﺭﻛﺔ ﺍﻻﺭﺳﺎﻝ ﻟﻧﺗﺣﻠﻳﻝ ﺍﻟﻣﻭﻳﺟﺎﺕ . ﺗﻡ ﺇﺳﺗﺧﺩﺍﻡ 
ﺗﻡ ﺗﻁﺑﻳﻖ ﻛﻣﺎ ﺍﻟﻣﻭﻗﻊ ﺃﻭ ﻣﻭﻗﻌﻳﻥ ﻣﺧﺗﻠﻔﻳﻥ ﻭﺗﺩﺭﻳﺏ ﺍﻟﻣﺻﻧﻔﺎﺕ ﻟﻠﻘﻳﺎﻡ ﺑﺎﻟﺗﻣﻳﻳﺯ ﻭﻣﻌﺭﻓﺔ ﻣﺩﻯ ﺍﻟﺗﺷﺎﺑﻪ ﻓﻲ ﺑﻳﺎﻧﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺣﺭﻛﺔ ﻟﻠﻣﻭﻗﻌﻳﻥ . 
ﻋﺩﺩ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﺻﻧﻔﺎﺕ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺳﻣﺎﺕ ﻭﺍﻟﻣﻳﺯﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﺗﺧﺭﺟﺔ ﺑﻁﺭﻳﻘﺔ ﺧﻭﺍﺭﺯﻣﻳﺔ ﻣﺳﺎﻓﺔ ﻟﻳﻔﻧﺷﺗﺎﻳﻥ ﻭﺗﻡ ﻣﻘﺎﺭﻧﺔ ﻧﺗﺎﺋﺞ ﺩﻗﺔ ﺍﻟﺗﻣﻳﻳﺯ 
ﻻﺳﺗﺧﺭﺍﺝ  ﺗﺣﻠﻳﻝ ﺍﻟﻣﻭﻳﺟﺎﺕﺗﻁﺑﻳﻖ ﻁﺭﻳﻘﺔ ﺟﺩﻳﺩﺓ ﻓﻲ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﺩﺭﺍﺳﺔ ﻭﻫﻲ ﻁﺭﻳﻘﺔ  ﺃﻳﺿﺎ ً  . ﻛﻣﺎ ﺗﻡﻟﻠﻣﺻﻧﻔﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﺗﺧﺩﻣﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺩﺭﺍﺳﺔ
ﺍﻟﻣﻳﺯﺍﺕ ﻭﺍﻟﺳﻣﺎﺕ ﻣﻥ ﺑﻳﺎﻧﺎﺕ ﺣﺭﻛﺔ ﺍﻻﺭﺳﺎﻝ ﻟﻠﻣﻭﺍﻗﻊ ﻣﻥ ﻗﺎﻋﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﺑﻳﺎﻧﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺷﺋﺔ. ﻁﺭﻳﻘﺔ ﺗﺣﻠﻳﻝ ﺍﻟﻣﻭﻳﺟﺎﺕ ﺗﻌﺗﻣﺩ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺇﺳﺗﺧﺭﺍﺝ  
ﺔ ﻟﺣﺯﻣﺔ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺑﻳﺎﻧﺎﺕ ﻟﻛﻝ ﻣﻭﻗﻊ ﺇﻧﺗﺭﻧﺕ ﻓﻲ ﻗﺎﻋﺩﺓ ﻣﻌﺎﻣﻼﺕ ﺍﻟﺗﻘﺭﻳﺏ ﻭﻣﻌﺎﻣﻼﺕ ﺍﻟﺗﻔﺎﺻﻳﻝ ﻣﻥ ﻣﺗﺳﻠﺳﻠﺔ ﺗﺿﻡ ﺃﺣﺟﺎﻡ ﻣﺧﺗﻠﻔ
  ﺍﻟﺑﻳﺎﻧﺎﺕ. 
ﻛﻣﺎ ﺗﻡ ﻓﻲ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﻌﻣﻝ ﻋﺭﺽ ﺍﻟﻧﺗﺎﺋﺞ ﺍﻟﺗﺟﺭﻳﺑﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺣﺎﺻﻠﺔ ﻣﻥ ﺗﻁﺑﻳﻖ ﺍﻟﻣﻳﺯﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺳﺎﺑﻘﺔ ﺑﺈﺳﺗﺧﺩﺍﻡ ﻗﺎﻋﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﺑﻳﺎﻧﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﻡ ﺗﻁﻭﻳﺭﻫﺎ 
  ﺭﺍﺳﺔ ﺳﺎﺑﻘﺔ(. ﻓﻲ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﻌﻣﻝ ﻭﻛﺫﻟﻙ ﺑﺈﺳﺗﺧﺩﺍﻡ ﻗﺎﻋﺩﺓ ﺑﻳﺎﻧﺎﺕ ﺃﺧﺭﻯ ﻣﺗﻭﻓﺭﺓ ) ﻗﺎﻋﺩﺓ ﺑﻳﺎﻧﺎﺕ ﺗﻡ ﺇﺳﺗﺧﺩﺍﻣﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺩ
ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﺗﻡ ﻓﻳﻬﺎ ﺇﻧﺷﺎء ﻗﺎﻋﺩﺓ ﺑﻳﺎﻧﺎﺕ ﻟﺩﺭﺍﺳﺔ ﺁﻟﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺗﻌﺭﻑ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻫﻭﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﻭﺍﻗﻊ  - ﺎﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﺩ ﻋﻠﻣﻧ ﻭﺫﻟﻙ -ﺍﻟﻣﺭﺓ ﺍﻷﻭﻟﻰ  ﻫﺫﻩ ﻭﺗﻌﺩ
ﺍﻻﻟﻛﺗﺭﻭﻧﻳﺔ ﺑﺈﺳﺗﺧﺩﺍﻡ ﻋﺩﺩ ﻣﻥ ﻣﺗﺻﻔﺣﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﻭﺍﻗﻊ ﺍﻷﻛﺛﺭ ﺷﻳﻭﻋﺎ ً ﻭﻛﺫﻟﻙ ﺗﻁﺑﻳﻖ ﻁﺭﻳﻘﺔ ﺗﺣﻠﻳﻝ ﺍﻟﻣﻭﻳﺟﺎﺕ ﻹﺳﺗﺧﺭﺍﺝ ﺍﻟﺳﻣﺎﺕ ﻣﻥ 
  ﻝ ﻟﻣﻭﺍﻗﻊ ﺍﻻﻧﺗﺭﻧﺕ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﻣﺕ ﺯﻳﺎﺭﺗﻬﺎ.ﺑﻳﺎﻧﺎﺕ ﺣﺭﻛﺔ ﺍﻻﺭﺳﺎ
ﻬﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﺩﺭﺍﺳﺔ ﺃﻅﻬﺭﺕ ﻧﺗﺎﺋﺞ ﻭﺍﻋﺩﺓ ﻳﻣﻛﻥ ﻣﻘﺎﺭﻧﺗﻬﺎ ﺑﻧﺗﺎﺋﺞ ﺍﻟﺩﺭﺍﺳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺳﺎﺑﻘﺔ , ﻭﻫﺫﺍ ﻳﺅﻛﺩ ﺣﺩﺳﻧﺎ ﺍﻻﻭﻝ ﺑﺄﻥ ﺍﻟﺗﺣﻠﻳﻠﻳﺔ ﻟ ﺗﺟﺎﺭﺏﺍﻟ
ﻥ ﺣﺟﻡ ﺳﺗﺧﺭﺍﺝ ﺍﻟﺳﻣﺎﺕ ﻣﺇﻁﺭﻳﻘﺔ ﺗﺣﻠﻳﻝ ﺍﻟﻣﻭﻳﺟﺎﺕ ﻳﻣﻛﻥ ﺇﺳﺗﺧﺩﺍﻣﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺗﻌﺭﻑ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻫﻭﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﻭﺍﻗﻊ ﺍﻻﻟﻛﺗﺭﻭﻧﻳﺔ ﺑﺎﻻﻋﺗﻣﺎﺩ ﻋﻠﻰ 
ﻭﺗﺭﺗﻳﺏ ﺣﺯﻣﺔ ﺑﻳﺎﻧﺎﺕ ﺍﻻﺭﺳﺎﻝ ﻟﻠﻣﻭﺍﻗﻊ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﻡ ﺯﻳﺎﺭﺗﻬﺎ. ﻛﻣﺎ ﺃﻥ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﺩﺭﺍﺳﺔ ﺃﻅﻬﺭﺕ ﺇﺧﺗﻼﻑ ﻧﺗﺎﺋﺞ ﺍﻟﺗﻌﺭﻑ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻫﻭﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﻭﺍﻗﻊ 
    ﺍﻻﻟﻛﺗﺭﻭﻧﻳﺔ ﻋﻧﺩ ﺇﺳﺗﺧﺩﺍﻡ ﻣﺗﺻﻔﺣﺎﺕ ﻣﺧﺗﻠﻔﺔ ﻟﻠﻣﻭﺍﻗﻊ. 
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Since last two decades, the internet has had a significant impact society and
businesses. In both fields, sharing information for the society or business purpose
has become the main factor for the internet users and service providers. Therefore,
a lot of attention has been given to achieve the privacy objective for the internet
users to hide their identities from the eavesdropping adversary.
Information privacy can be defined as the right to be free from surveillance.
The main concern of the internet users is to share their personal information with
the third party without letting the unwanted observers to access their information.
Many systems have been developed to achieve the privacy objective by encrypt-
ing the client data precisely the client identity and his website destination address
and content. One of these systems is a Tor anonymity system. The Tor anonymity
system is low-latency anonymity system [1, 2, 3] that is being used by 500,000
users everyday [2]. The Tor Anonymity Network consists of 4000 relays [4] from
which circuit of three relays is built to route the client data to destination [2, 5].
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In other words, the communication between the user client and web server for re-
questing specific website/web-service through the Tor network is routed through
a number of volunteer relays using multiple layers of encryption [2].
Most practical attacks against the Tor system are based on traffic analysis.
Attackers have ability to reveal some information about the client and the visited
website identity by observing and analyzing the packet traffic and extracting pat-
terns that primarily consist of specific features of the traffic packet such as packet
time, packet size, order and direction of the packets, etc.
website traffic fingerprinting is ” an attack where the adversary attempts to
recognize the encrypted traffic patterns of specific web pages” [2]. The attackers
collect the traffic packets for the target websites (websites visited by the client
through the Tor system) and extract some features to be used in the classification
process. Training and testing the extracted features will be used to identify and
classify the website class (assigning the traffic to a certain website) by calculating
the similarities between the features of the trained traffic packets and the new
traffic packets using some classification techniques such as Support Vector Machine
(SVM)[2] and Multinomial Naive-Bayes (MNB)[6].
Recently, few researches proposed website fingerprinting techniques on Tor
anonymity system [6, 7, 8]. These studies have shown that applying website
fingerprinting on Tor system is more challenging than other anonymity systems
for three main factors[2]:
1. The size of data unit sent through the tor network is fixed (512 bytes)
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2. More than one circuit of three relays are used to transfer the information
from the Tor client, which affect the performance in terms of network latency,
network bandwidth and transfer congestion.
3. Data transferred through Tor traffic are affected with unnecessary additional
data which are resulted from the activities performed by Tor such as network
construction, network testing and controlling network.
Despite the challenges of applying website fingerprinting on the Tor anonymity
system, the studies have shown the possibility of obtaining a high accuracy rate
over 80% based on simplified feature extraction that aim to remove features (e.g
SENDMEs control cell [2], ACKs [4, 5]) that provide no useful information and
reduce the accuracy of the classification.
This research investigates a new websites fingerprinting technique based on
wavelet packet decomposition method using websites packet traces visited by dif-
ferent web browsers. Most of existing works have reported their results based on
packet sizes, packet order, packet sequence and directions as a features to train
the classifiers. Recently edit distance methods have been more involved in website
fingerprinting [2, 5]. To the best of our knowledge, all the previous work have
been implemented their approaches using dataset collected from Tor browser. In
this work, we have built our own dataset for websites packet traces using six dif-
ferent browsers (Firefox, Chrome, Internet explorer, Safari, Opera and Tor). We
have introduced the preprocessing steps to build up our dataset starting from cap-
turing, parsing, analyzing, filtering the traffic of the websites. Besides, we have
3
developed automation scripts to automate websites visiting process using differ-
ent web browsers. We validate our generated dataset for website fingerprinting by
using two different approaches. We firstly implemented Edit distance method for
website fingerprinting on our generated dataset. We used Levenshtein distance
to calculate the distances between the traces of certain sample of websites traces
and we used different classifiers to evaluate the classification method. Then we
introduced a new method based on wavelet packet decomposition. The wavelet
packet decomposition method was applied to the packet sequences of the websites
traces to extract the pattern for the classification. The wavelet transform method
has been widely used in pattern recognition, especially in image processing and
signal processing, face classification and audio classification. To the best of our
knowledge, wavelet method was not used for website fingerprinting in the previous
works.
The main contributions of this work are as follows:
1. Building a new dataset for website fingerprinting using six different web
browsers. All previous website fingerprinting techniques evaluate their ap-
proach to the data collected by Tor browser.
2. Feature extraction and selection. We investigate two different feature ex-
traction methods using edit distance and wavelet packet decomposition. We
applied the two feature extraction method on our generated dataset.
3. Evaluating the feature extraction method using different classifiers (support
vector machine, MultilayerPerceptron and the Naive Bayes).
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This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a background of
anonymity systems. It surveys the structure of the most anonymity systems and
how they work. Tor anonymity protocol structure and work mechanism has been
extensively presented in this chapter since it is the main subject of this research.
Chapter 3 surveys the website fingerprinting techniques at attack type and level,
preprocessing phase, the used features, classifiers, the obtained accuracy, and the
datasets used by researchers. The different phases of building the dataset (traffic
capturing, packets filtering and data preprocessing) using different web browsers
are presented in chapter 4. Chapter 5 discusses the different methods for ex-
tracted the features of the packet traces of the websites and the used classifiers.
The results of our experiments are discussed in chapter 6. finally, conclusions are




The communication networks use addresses to route the traffic, which are visi-
ble to anyone observing the network. These addresses (such as IP addresses, or
Ethernet MACs) are the unique identifiers of the users that appear in their com-
munication. Linking theses address to the users will compromise their privacy.
Therefore, anonymizing the communication is necessary to protect the privacy
of users against traffic analysis and attackers and prevent them to obtain the
sensitive information and Identities of users .
Anonymous communication systems play a vital role in protecting privacy of
people from network surveillance and traffic analysis. They provide the ability
for the users to hide their network identity and prevent the observers to know
the actual source or destination of messages. Most of Anonymous systems work
based on transmitting the traffic via one or more proxies and encrypting the traffic.
These systems are classified to low-latency and high-latency anonymous systems.
In this chapter we present a background for the main low- latency Anonymous
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systems that are designed for interactive applications such as web browsing. The
presented low- latency Anonymous systems share the deterministic routing feature
which means the path of nodes or proxies for sending the traffic is known in
advance.
2.1 Anonymous Proxy Servers
Proxy servers are the systems or applications that work as a mediator between
the client and other servers. One type of proxy server is the forward proxy that
used to retrieve the requests to the user and connect the user with the target. On
the other word, the target is communicating with the proxy server as the owner
of the request and the real user will be unknown to the target. Figure 2.1 shows
the proxy server connection.The client connects to the proxy server through the
client’s ISP for requesting some resources or services such as web page. The proxy
server evaluates the request and contacts the web server to retrieve the requested
web page.
Figure 2.1: proxy server connection
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2.2 Java Anonymous Proxy (JAP)
Java Anonymous Proxy (JAP) is a client application developed for AN.ON
project, which is also known as (JonDo). JAP and AN.ON is developed by The
University of Dresden in 2001 [9].
The anonymity part is taking place in JAP proxy when the user connects to the
web server using Mix networks. Mix networks are a chain of proxy servers which
are used to deliver the messages from different users to different destinations.
A chain of proxy servers is known as mixes. The messages or requests from the
users to the destinations will be mixed using Mix Cascades approach to achieve the
anonymity and observability. In such case the data traffic will be unrecognizable
to whom it belongs to [9, 10].
Figure 2.2: Mix network connection
As shown in figure 2.3, the JAP client application is installed in the client
computer ( referred as User A, User B and User C ) and combined with web
browser for the anonymity objective. Using the info service, a list of the available
cascades (mixes) will be retrieved to the JAP client to choose the desired mix and
connects the user in this mix (cascade). It’s the responsibility of the JAP client
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to check the traffic load, online users, availability cascades etc.
Figure 2.3: Jap network Structure
In the JAP application, the data traffic is encrypted based on the mixes that
are used. Symmetric encryption (RSA 1024+ bit key length) is used for key en-
cryption (between the mixes) and asymmetric encryption (AES 128 bit key length)
for the data traffic for better efficiency [9]. The encryption process has taken place
within the mixes, which mean that when the data traffic leaves the cascade, it
will be unencrypted and requires the users to provide another encryption method
for such level.
2.3 Tor protocol
Tor protocol is an anonymous communication systems that can be used as a
virtual tunnel for the Internet user to be communicated privately and securely. Tor
protocol has been designed and developed by Onion Routing technology project
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to resist the traffic analysis and network observation. It is a free software and an
open network that has been implemented based on an onion routing to achieve
the online anonymity for the client [4, 11]. Tor protocol is the second generation
onion router system with many advantages compared to the previous generation.
Besides the anonymity browsing services that are provided by Tor, and using
the instant messaging application without leaking the contents and objects of
the conversation, Tor application can be used to break the blocked websites by
Internet service provider and do not leak any identifiable information to that
Internet service provider.
Traffic analysis is a common surveillance technique on the Internet that can be
used reveal the address and location information on communication sides. Traffic
data packet consists of two main parts, the first part is data payload which is
the content that will be transmitted to the recipient. The data payload part is
encrypted commonly. The second one is the packet header that keeps information
regarding to the IP addresses of the source and destination. This part of the traffic
packet is unencrypted which means that the traffic analysis can access to the IP
address information and retrieve more information about the users. Figure2.4
shows the structure of the IP packet.
As we see from the header part of the IP packet, it discloses reasonable in-
formation such as the source and destination IPs, size, timing, and so on. With
the expose of source and destination information, the eavesdropper can easily get
sensitive information about the Identity and the location of the Internet user.
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Figure 2.4: IP packet structure
Currently, Tor network is considered the most widely used low latency
anonymity networks with approximately 500,000 users daily and it has been con-
sisted of more than 4000 nodes known as Onion Routers distributed across the
world [12].
By default, Tor circuits consist of three nodes, the guard node which is the
only node that recognize the client’s identity, the middleman that is responsible
for exchanging the encrypted cell between the guard node and the exit node, and
the exit node which is the only node that recognize the destination identity.
Tor client contacts Tor network, which creates a random path to the destina-
tion server. As the Tor client wants to communicate with the destination server
with a hidden identity, he will send the message to the destination through differ-
11
ent Tor machine node on the Tor network. Therefore, the first step is for the Tor
client to contact a directory server to obtain a list of Tor nodes. The directory
server is a Tor node that provides the list of Tor nodes to the Tor client to choose
a list of nodes - usually three nodes- to send the message to the destination server
through them. Figure 2.5 shows the first step of communication to obtain a list
of Tor nodes from a directory server.
Figure 2.5: How Tor is working Step 1: Tor documentation source
When the path of the selected Tor network is established, the Tor client can
send the message to the first node (guard node) which will forward the next
node in the path (the middleman) until it reaches the exit node, the last node in
the selected path before the destination server. The exit node is responsible of
delivering the message destination server. The destination server will deal with
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the exit node as the origin of the message request which means that the identity
of the original client will be hidden from the destination server. Figure 2.6 shows
the chosen path from the Tor client to the destination server.
Figure 2.6: How Tor is working Step2: Tor documentation source
The selected Tor network can be changed at any time due the inactivity of one
of the tor network nodes or the time of tor network activity reached for a certain
time limit (as per Tor project documentation, the time limit for the selected path
to be active must be exceed 10 minutes). Figure 2.7 shows the changing of the
Tor network path.
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Figure 2.7: How Tor is working Step3: Tor documentation source
Using the Tor protocol, the data traffic or stream is divided into fixed sized
cells, the main aspect of encryption and traffic anonymity on Tor protocol, en-
crypted with identifying key for the Tor circuit nodes.
2.3.1 Circuits and Onion Encryption
An onion proxy (OP) is used to handle the Tor circuit creation and encryption
transparently. Tor protocol uses layered encryption, which mean the encryption
process is taking place between the onion routers to ensure that each onion router
knows only the adjacent node in the Tor circuit. Since the traffic between each
two onion nodes of the Tor circuit is completely different in the encryption, it
will be difficult for the attacker and traffic analysis to compare the traffic between
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two adjacent nodes in the Tor circuit. However, the traffic between the exit node
and destination, where the client is connecting to, is not encrypted, which means
that the encryption process is taking place within the routers (nodes) of the Tor
network.
The encryption process of the traffic between the Tor circuit nodes is done by
negotiating a symmetric key with each node and encrypting the messages with the
negotiated key in every node. Figure 2.8 shows the process of message encryption.
Message is encrypted using different encryption layers and then sent through the
circuit. A plain text message is first encrypted with the public key of the third
relay, then another encryption layer is added with the public key of the middle
relay, and finally an encryption layer with the public key of the entry relay. That
message will be processed as follows when it is transferred: Like someone peeling
or removing the outer cover of the onion, each onion router removes the encryption
layer using its public key and forward the message next router. This process is
repeated until the message arriving to the last node in the Tor circuit. This
process of removing the encryption layers, using the public key of each Tor node,
preventing the intermediary nodes from getting address information ( source and
destination of the massage) and content of the message.
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Figure 2.8: Message encryption layers and routing path
Let’s assume that Alice (Tor client) uses the Tor protocol to communicate with
Bob (destination) through a Tor network circuit consisting of of three tor routers
(R1, R2, R3). Symmetric keys (K1, K2, and K3) will be negotiated through the
nodes circuit. When the message M is sent, M will be encrypted with K3K2K1
respectively. As the message passes through the circuit, the first node in the
circuit decrypts the message with its symmetric key. The R1 will decrypt M using
K1, R2 will decrypt M using K2 and so on. Figure 2.9 shows the decryption
process of the message through the Tor path.
Figure 2.9: Message with symmetric keys through Tor path
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2.3.2 Tor Cell
In Tor protocol, the Tor routers are communicating by using Tor cells. Tor cell is
512-bytes long formatted as shown in figure 2.10:
Figure 2.10: The format of Tor Cell
There are two types of Tor cells [13]:
1. Control Cell: the value of the command filed of the control cell is:
(a) CELL PADDING: used for keepalive and optionally used for link
padding, although not used currently. [13].
(b) CELL CREATE: used to initiate a connection between two Tor pro-
cesses. This command mainly used to create the first hop between the
onion proxy and the first onion router in the circuit. It is also used to
extend the Tor circuit by one hop through the communication between
the Tor onion nodes.
(c) CREATED: used for the confirmation of the Create cell command.
(d) DESTROY: used for releasing a Tor circuit.
2. Relay cell: The command field (Command) of a relay cell defines the purpose
of the relay cell. BEGIN, END, and CONNECTED relay commands are
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used for setting up and demolishing TCP streams on the Tor circuit. In
addition, the DATA relay command is used to send data through TCP
stream. For constructing a new circuit EXTEND and EXTENDED relay
cells are used. The recognized field relay cell header is used to tell the onion
router whether the cell is fully decrypted by setting its value to zero. If the
cell is fully decrypted, then the digest will be the four bytes of the running
digest of all of the bytes destined for or originated from this hop in the
circuit. [13] The StreamID field is used by the onion proxy and the exit
router to differentiate between various streams on the Tor circuit. Finally,
the Length field of the relay cell indicates to the number of bytes of the data
field that contain the real data. Figure 2.11 shows relay cell format.
Figure 2.11: Relay Cell Payload Format
Figure 2.12 below shows the circuit creation Workflow. The diagram shows
the steps and the commands of creation Tor circuit that consists of three router
nodes R1, R2 and R3. Alice is the client Tor who is running the onion proxy. K1,
K2 and K3 are the symmetric keys assigned during the Tor circuits creation
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Website fingerprinting [14] is a variant of passive traffic analysis that can be
carried out by a local eavesdropper or by any entity observing Tor client traffic.
In traffic analysis attack, the adversary analyses the traffic to extract patterns
that can reveal the identity of the website accessed by the client. Patterns are
constructed from certain features in the traffic such as the size of transferred data,
the timing, the order of packets, etc.
Website fingerprinting was first used to analyze encrypted HTTP traffic
[14, 15, 16, 17]. Most of these attacks were based on tracking the size the objects
fetched by the main web page. With the migration to HTTP/1.1 which makes use
of persistent connections and pipelining, it is no longer possible to easily distin-
guish between single objects fetching. Only a few works focused on implementing
website fingerprinting on anonymity systems [2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 18]. It turned out
that website fingerprinting is much challenging when applied on anonymity sys-
tems in particular Tor. The reason is that Tor protocol performs some structural
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modifications in the traffic: restructuring the traffic into fixed size cells, merging
small packets together, multiplexing TCP streams, etc. However, despite these
challenges, recent works showed that the accuracy of website fingerprinting could
be as high as 87% [5] and 91% [2] when applied on Tor.
In this chapter, a survey of the previous works on website fingerprinting is
presented. We classified the previous works to defenses and attacks approaches.
3.1 Website Fingerprinting Defenses
Fu, et al. [19] present a defense approach based on inserting dummy packets with
randomized intervals between the packets. They claimed that using non-constant
intervals between the introduced dummy packets will reduce the success rate of
the traffic analysis. Padding packets schemes were proposed in different works
to defeat the traffic analysis [16, 17, 20]. They proposed different techniques
for padding packets, such as pad-to-MTU, exponential padding, random padding,
etc. Dyer, et al., proved that most of the padding schemes were ineffective against
their evaluated attacks [21]. An alternative approach to packet padding approach
was proposed by Wright et al. [22]. They introduced a traffic morphing scheme
to transform the distribution of source packet size using splitting or padding tech-
niques for the packets to imitate the distribution of the target website. A new
scheme of traffic morphing, based on padding and fragmenting the packet sizes
to n-grams, was proposed by [23]. Dyer, et al., also showed that the defense
approach based traffic morphing was ineffective [21].
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Dyer, et al., proposed new defense approach known as Buffered Fixed-Length
Obfuscator (BuFLO) for hiding the loading total time and bandwidth. The ap-
proach works by transmitting fixed-length packets at fixed interval for fixed time.
Dyer, et al claimed that their new defense BuFLO approach doesnt leak the packet
timing information which helps in reducing the best attack recognition rate.
Another approach called HTTPOS defense has been proposed in [24]. The
proposed approach allows the client to hide the actual packet length by inserting
request objects using maximum TCP segmentation, size to reduce and hide packet
sizes [24].
The first successful attack on the Tor protocol was proposed by Panchenko et
al. [7]. As a result of this successful attack, new defense was developed by Tor
developers to resist the new successful attack. The new defense approach works by
enabling the HTTP pipelining which allows the Multiple Simultaneous Requests
taken into account that the pipeline size the order of the request are randomized.
3.2 Website Fingerprinting Attacks
Several researches studied attacks on anonymity systems from different angles. In
this section, we present the previously published works on website fingerprinting
attacks and we address the systems or protocols that each proposed attack target.
Features and parameters used for each attack will be addressed, including the
datasets to test and evaluate the attack.
Fingerprinting attacks have been first proposed against the encrypted web
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traffic system such as SSH, VPN, IPsec or WPA. [6, 14, 15, 16, 17, 23, 25]. The
proposed attacks focused mainly on packet length.
Liberatore and Levine[15] proposed an approach for website fingerprinting
based on length of two directions packet (incoming and outgoing packets). They
used packet size frequencies for a traced traffic to classify the observed instance of
packet size of the tested website. Naive Bayes classifier has used in this work for
classification purpose. They got good results based on the packet size frequency
histogram. They applied their approach under the simple encryption system (SSH
tunnel) not under the Tor system.
Herrmann et al. [6] used text mining techniques for website fingerprinting [2]
and obtained better classification results than the previous work of Liberatore and
Levine. Both [6, 15] used the packets size, frequency histogram and discarded the
other two main elements in traffic tracing which are ordering and timing. They
tested their experiment on 775 websites [6]. Multinomial Naive Bayes classifier
(MNB) was used with consideration that the packet length frequency is used as an
exponent to the relevant probability value. However, their recognition rate of the
Tor system was very low (only 3%) compared with the recognition rate obtained
by the simple encryption system. Low recognition accuracy under Tor anonymity
system shows that website fingerprinting on Tor system is more challenging than
website fingerprinting on simple encrypting systems.
Shi et al [8] has presented a new approach for website fingerprinting on the
Tor. In his study, the number of incoming or outgoing packets of top 20 websites
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in Japan in certain time was traced and then the time for a certain number of
packets were represented as a vector [8]. The study has reported identification
rate of 50%.
Panchenko et al. [7] presented an approach for website fingerprinting on two
anonymity system (Tor and JonDonym) and used extra features rather than the
packet size and direction features that have used in previous works. Some of the
new features that the study have used are: sizes of all packets in one direction
during interval time, packet size marker, packet number marker, the percentage of
incoming bytes, etc.. [7]. Support Vector Machine classifier has used under Weka
environment[26] to classify the website fingerprinting On anonymity networks (Tor
and JonDonym). The study used the same data set of websites that have used in
Herrmann et al. [6] in the closed-world experiment part. The study succeeded to
increase the recognition rate under Tor from 3% to 55%.
Aggarwal, et al. [27] proposed complete analysis of security and privacy of the
modern browsers. They showed that each of modern browser has each own design
structure and mechanism to support the privacy in the browsing. The study has
classified the attacks that private browsing tries to avoid to local attacks and
web attacks. Complete analysis of the implementation of the most four popular
browsers from the point of view of security of the browsing has conducted in the
study. As per Aggarwal, et al. [27], browser extensions and plugins has a negative
effect to achieve the goals of private browsing.
One of the most recent works for website fingerprinting on Tor is Cai et al.[5].
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In this study, traffic traces are represented as a sequence of positive packet lengths
for outgoing packets and negative packet lengths for incoming packets. The dis-
tance between the traffic traces is computed by optimal string alignment distance
algorithm[5]. Support Vector Machine has used with a distance based kernel.
They used Damerau-Levenshtein[28, 29] edit distance to calculate the distance
between the traces and normalizing this distance with respect to the lengths of
the shortest trace between the two traces. The study used 800 websites according
to Alexa for classification and evaluation purpose. The filtered websites were vis-
ited under Tor system In closed world model. The study has reported accuracy
recognition rate of 87% for the visited websites.
The most recent contribution was by Tao Wang et al [2]. The study claims
that Collecting Data on Tor should be more accurate since there are a number
of factors that may have a negative impact on the obtained results. As per the
study, the factors that should be taken into account are circuit construction,
timing and website localization[2]. Using Tor controller, different circuits and
modification of the top sites list are the procedures that the study used them to
avoid the impact in data collection because of the previous factors. The study
also proposed new data processing approach based on Tor cell sequences instead of
TCP/IP packet sequences. The study has reported accuracy of 91% as compared
to 87% of accuracy obtained previous works in the closed-world experiments [2].
relatively high accuracy rates, most of the existing works depend on packet size,
packet length frequency and packet ordering as main features for classification.
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It is obvious that using packet sizes without the timing and order information to
attack the Tor traffic is more challenging than the other encrypted systems due
to strong padding packet mechanism of tor system that provides less information
[5, 6, 7, 8, 18].
We strongly think that using a feature extraction method that depend on
packet sizes and packet order that represents the time sequence of the packet size
will have an impact on the accuracy of the website fingerprinting. We strongly
think that using wavelet packet decomposition as feature extraction of the packet
sizes sequence as the wavelet method has proven to be used successfully different
fields of pattern recognition [30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37].
Besides that, all existing works carried out their experiment on websites using
a single web browser to evaluate the accuracy of the techniques. We developed
our own dataset using the six common browsers to evaluate our proposed method





In this research, we conducted our experiments based on two data sets of packet
sizes for the websites visited through the Tor protocol. The first dataset shared
by Cai [5] which consists in traffic data for 100 websites and 40 samples. The
second dataset was generated by us using different tools for visit automation
and packet capturing. This chapter presents the design and implementation of
our data collection process. It presents the environment setup and processes of
collecting and processing the data using special tools for each process.
4.1 Data collection
For the purpose of this research, we have built and developed a dataset for websites
fingerprinting. The developed dataset contains packet traces for 20 websites and
15 samples for each website visited by six different browsers. Each website trace
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contains a sequence of packet sizes of website visit session under the Tor protocol.
The following subsections describe the environment setup and tools that are used
for collecting- capturing- the raw packet data for the visited websites through the
Tor protocol.
4.1.1 Environment setup
A client Machine was set up and utilized for the purpose of website traffic genera-
tion, capturing and processing. Table 4.1 shows the specifications of the machines
and systems that were used to collect and process the data (website traffic). We
started collecting and capturing the website traffic using the Ubuntu operating
system and Firefox 3.6 version. We used the Chickenfoot automation tools for
automating the websites visiting. Since our main goal of this research is to inves-
tigate the website fingerprinting in different browsers, we set up a second machine
with windows 8 operating system and we used Selenium WebDriver tools with
some code modification to automate websites visiting on all six browsers.
Dataset 1 Dataset 2
CPU Intel Core i5 Intel Core2 Duo
RAM 6 GB 4 GB
Operating System Microsoft Windows 8 Ubuntu 10.04.4
Web Brwoser FireFox,Chrome,IE,Safari,Opera and Tor FireFox
Tor Vidalia Vidalia 0.2.21 Vidalia 0.2.21
packet analyzer Windump Tcpdump
web automation/scripting Selenium Chickenfoot




Several tools were used in data collection phase to generate and develop the data
set for website fingerprinting. We used web browser automation tools to automate
a browser to visit a list of websites. At the same time, a tool for capturing and
analyzing the website traffic was used to capture the raw packets and display them
in human-readable format.
4.1.2.1 Tor Vidalia Bundle
In order to connect to Tor network and configure the browsers to use the Tor
protocol, we used Vidalia Bundles for Windows which comes with Tor and Vidalia
(a cross-platform graphical controller for the Tor) [38]. The called browsers were
configured to use Tor protocol by setting up the SOCKS5 proxy server to localhost
or 127.0.0.1 with port 9050.
Figure 4.1: FireFox Browser config-
uration set up to use Tor
Figure 4.2: IE- Browser configura-
tion set up to use Tor
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4.1.2.2 Chickenfoot
Chickenfoot [39] is a Firefox extension and add-on that provides a programming
environment in the browsers sidebar which enable users to write scripts to auto-
mate and customize the web browsing. The scripts are written with predefined
Chickenfoot functions to perform specific web tasks.
Figure 4.3: Chickenfoot automation plugin
Chickenfoot supports the Firefox browser 3.6. It’s available as a sidebar op-
tion in the Firefox view menu. Chickenfoot plugs contains a JavaScript editor
that allows to enter the command in JavaScript. The lower portion of the Chick-
enfoot sidebar presents an interface with four tabs: Output, Patterns, Actions,
and Triggers. Here’s a brief description of the tabs cite miller2010rewriting:
• Output: shows the results or output of the running script.
• Patterns: shows the search patterns for locating common elements in a
page.
• Actions: Contains all user actions within the browser page.
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• Triggers: contains the scripts that will be automatically run when a certain
Web page is visited.
Figure 4.4: Chickenfoot script editor
For our automation purpose, we create a JavaScript file to perform the websites
visiting automation using predefined functions of Chickenfoot such as go (), wait
() and output (). We put 5 seconds interval time between every website visit to
avoid packets correlation for website packets.
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Figure 4.5: Chickenfoot Java Script file
The output file of the websites visit automation will include the website num-
ber, visit number, start time, end time and website loading time interval. Start
time and Stop time for the website visits will be in milliseconds.
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Figure 4.6: Chickenfoot output
4.1.2.3 Selenium WebDriver
Selenium WebDriver is one of the most used tools for browser automation. It
is a portable, open source software available for Windows that allows users and
developers alike to use and develop a functional process to drive and automate
the browser. Selenium has been developed using JavaScript that any browser that
support JavaScript [40] .
Selenium WebDriver has been used in this work to automate the process of
visiting a list of websites by different browsers. We developed Java code with
Selenium WebDriver using browser webdriver to make direct calls to the browser
and automate the visiting of a list of websites. Figure 4.7 shows our customized
codes to call the WebDrivers of the used web browsers.
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Figure 4.7: Selenium WebDriver
For every website visit, when a website is fully loaded, a detailed timing infor-
mation is provided, including the start time and end time and total load time - in
microseconds - for website loading. We put a 5 second gap between two website
visits to avoid the overlap in capturing the raw packet data for each website. The
browser cache property was disabled and all cached website page contents were
deleted after the website is fully loaded to guarantee that the next visit to the
same website will load all page contents from the server and provide the actual
time load for the visited website.
4.1.2.4 WinDump
The WinDump tool (windows version of tcpdump) is used in the windows envi-
ronment to capture and view the data packets for the network traffic. WinDump
is an executable file available on http://www.winpcap.org/windump/. It runs
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on Command Prompt window and provides options to display and specify the
network interfaces, filter the captured network packets,etc . . .
Figure 4.8 shows the windump command options and parameters that are used
in this work:
1. -i2 : For specifying which Ethernet interfaces that the network traffic will
be captured from it.
2. -nn : To avoid converting the address and port numbers to names.
3. -tttt : To view a timestamp in default format for each packet.
Figure 4.8: Packet capture from the network using Windump
The WinDump program can be run with the w or >options which cause the
packet data to be saved in data files such as .txt or .pcap data format.
Figure 4.9 shows sample of the data packets captured using windump tool.
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Figure 4.9: Sample of packet data captured by windump
4.2 Data Processing
During the data collection phase, WinDump was used to capture the network
traffic on the determined Ethernet interface. The process of websites visiting with
selenium webdriver tool generates significant network traffic, which is captured
using WinDump. As a result of the WinDump capturing process for the network
traffic, a raw packet data will be stored data file format.
Twenty websites are selected to be visited automatically using our developed
tool 20 times. As a result of the data processing phase, we end up with 400 files (20
website x 20 sample). We exclude undesirable website traces, usually the website
traces that contain no packets or have too few numbers of packets compared to
the other traces for the same website, and we select the top 15 samples out of 20
samples for every website.
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Next subsections show how we filtered the raw packet data for building our
dataset.
4.2.1 Filtering Tor packet data
In this stage, we filter the captured packets based on whether the packets are Tor
packet or non-Tor packet. To achieve this goal, we have implemented a filter to
check whether the source or destination IPs in the data packet match any IP in
the Tor relays IPs list. We keep updating for all Tor relays IPs by two different
ways:
1. We extract the all relays nodes IPs from the local configuration file of the
Tor Vidalia bundle. These IPs are all IPs used to construct the Tor path
network. The relays configuration file provides other information about the
date and time that the relays were in use and the ports that the relays
accessed through. Figure 4.10 shows the local configuration file with the
name of cached-microdesc-consensus that contains ip’s of Tor relay node. In
this file, each line starts with r character has an ip for Tor relay.
2. We obtain the latest Tor exit node IPs list from
https://collector.torproject.org/archive/exit-lists/. And all the lat-
est Tor relies IPs list from https://collector.torproject.org/relay-
descriptors/microdescs/.
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Figure 4.10: IP’s of Tor relays in local configuration file of Vidalia bundle
4.2.2 Identifying Tor packet data for each website
In this stage, the start and stop times for loading website page were used to
compare with the time stamp of the packets captured by WinDump. If the time
stamp of the packet being captured is located within the time interval for website
page loading, the packet will be exported to a file that contains all packets for a
specific website and visit. The timestamps for both website loading and packets
capturing were in microseconds to avoid missing some packets that related to
certain websites. Figure 4.11 shows the start time and stop time for loading certain
website that compared with the time stamp of the captured packet presented in
figure 4.12.
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Figure 4.11: Timing details for web-
site page load
Figure 4.12: Timing details for Tor
Captured packets
4.2.3 Extracting Tor packet sizes
After we identified the Tor packet data for each website and visit, we extract
the Tor packet size of the raw packet data and assign the positive or negative
sign based on whether the packet is incoming or outgoing. Packet sizes of value
zero were excluded since they are usually acknowledgment packets that provide
no information. Figure 4.13 presents sample of packet sizes for website 1 for five
visits that extracted.
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Figure 4.13: Sequence of Tor packet size for the website 1 for 5 visits(samples)
4.2.4 Extracting Inter packet time
The time between two packets arriving at a host is known as inter-packet arriving
time (IPT). We have extracted the inter packet time of the arriving packets from
the Tor packet data for each website and visit. We used the IPT’s for every two
arriving packets in the Tor packet data sequence as a features for the Tor traffic
of the website. We investigated the ability of using the IPT as a feature for the
Tor traffic for websites classification but unfortunately we have obtained poor
accuracy. This is due to the timing issue of the Tor circuit which including the
time to construct and choose the Tor circuit beside the time to select another
random.
40





Over the last few years, several researchers addressed the problem of website
fingerprinting recognition. Most of the available feature extraction methods were
based on the packet information features such as the packet size, packet direction
etc.. Some researchers used integrated feature extraction methods such packet
size with editing distance [2, 5]. Even though the published results in these
papers are very good, some issues are still remaining like using different browsers
for collecting data and extract the features and investigating other classifiers for
the classification.
One of the goals of this research is to use wavelet feature extraction method
for website fingerprinting recognition with acceptable recognition rates. We have
investigated different types of wavelet functions using the packet size sequence
as a feature of website traces. One of the investigated methods (wavelet packet
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decomposition) was used in [41] with a neural network classifier. In [41], wavelet
method was used to extract several hidden features of the time-frequency infor-
mation of network traffic.
In this chapter, several types of features are extracted for website fingerprint-
ing. Two main features extraction methods were used in this research work. We
implemented the edit distance feature extraction method of Cai work [5] on our
new developed dataset. We also investigated a new feature extraction method
(wavelet method for signal processing) using two different datasets. Size and
direction of the Tor packet for the website are the primary data input in both
Cai dataset and our developed dataset. Both feature extraction methods depend
on extracting features from the sequence of the packet size. The results of the
new wavelet extraction method show that our extraction method is a suitable
for the website fingerprinting and it opens new direction to use signal processing
techniques for website fingerprinting.
5.1 Feature extraction methods
5.1.1 Edit distance
The similarity and dissimilarity between two sequences can be calculated based on
the number of operations needed to transform one sequence into another. Given a
set of packet size sequences, the distance between pairs of them helps in finding the
similarity between the two sequences and derive structural relationship amongst
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them.
A traffic instance under Tor protocol is represented as a sequence of packet
sizes with positive or negative sign indicating to outgoing and incoming packets
respectively. In order classify the traffic traces and get acceptable success rate
of website fingerprinting, distance-based metrics have been used in some previous
work. Distance-based metrics compute the sequence of the packets size as they
train the classifiers for website fingerprinting
5.1.1.1 Optimal String Alignment Distance(OSAD)
Optimal string alignment distance (OSAD) was used in previous work to calcu-
late the distance between two traffic traces by identifying the minimal number
of operations (insertions, deletions, substitutions and transpositions) required to
transfer one sequence to another. It takes into account that the transpositions
operations can be held only on the adjacent elements of the string.
The cost of each operation can be assigned differently without affecting the
validity of the optimal string alignment distance algorithm [2]. For example the
distance between the strings xyz and zx will be 3 operations (delete y, delete
z, insert z before x) instead of 2 operations (delete y, transpose z and x) since
the restriction of transposition operation for the non-adjacent elements. The cost
assigned for the insertions, deletions, substitutions operations should be higher
than the cost of the transposition operation to keep distance symmetry [2]
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5.1.1.2 Damerau-Levenshtein Distance (DLD)
The distance between two sequences of fixed length where minimum transform op-
erations are applied to transform one sequence into other is referred as Damerau-
Levenshtein Distance [42].
Damerau-Levenshtein Distance describes the number of insertions, deletions,
substitutions and transpositions operations required to transform a sequence of
characters to another [2]. Damerau-Levenshtein Distance differs from Optimal
String Alignment Distance in the restriction of the transportation operation.
Damerau-Levenshtein distance remove the restriction on transpositions operation.
Figure 5.1 shows the pseudo code of Dameraul Levenshtein distance.
Figure 5.1: Pseudocode of DamerauLevenshtein distance
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5.1.2 Wavelet Packet Decomposition
The wavelet transform has been extensively used in signal processing analysis.
It has proven to be very efficient in many engineering fields problems [31, 33,
35, 37, 43]. The frequency content of the signal can be represented by window
frames using Fourier transform which ignores the time localization information
of the signal. For achieving the time localization information, the window frame
should be varied so that it will be in a wider range of low frequencies and a
slight range of higher frequencies. Thus the Wavelet transform has provided a
flexibility to represent the time and the frequencies of the signal. It provides
detailed information for low level frequencies and detailed information about the
time at high frequencies which makes it suitable for the analysis of inconsistence
data patterns over different time intervals.
Wavelet packet decomposition (WPD) is an extension and simplification of
wavelets which use the entire decomposition for the signal including the low-
pass and high-pass to create the complete representation of the signals. It is
obtained by applying a recursion of a decimation process to reduce the sample
rate of the signals or the size of the data sample. WPD provides a level by level
transformation of a signal from the time domain into the frequency domain [43]
such that the high frequencies of a given signal could be resolved within a small
time frame while the low frequencies nee be resolved by a large time frame.
At each level of WPD, two sets of coefficients are generated, the approximation
coefficients and detail coefficients. The approximation coefficients are produced
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by convolving the input signal (packet sequence sizes) with the low-pass filter and
down-sampling by a factor of two. The detail coefficients are similarly produced
by convolving the input signal (packet sequence sizes) with high-pass filter. For
the new level, unlike the wavelet decomposition, both approximation coefficients
and detail coefficients will be convolved with the low-pass filter and high-pass
filter and down-sampling to generate a new level of decomposition. The ability
to iterate both low-pass and high-pass filter in wavelet decomposition method
will lead generating more than one basis function rather than one basis function
-and two basic functions in the last level- in the case of the wavelet transform.
Iterating the low-pass and high-pass filters will generate the complete tree basis
where the top level of the WPD tree is the time representation of the signal and
the bottom level of a fully decomposed tree is the frequency representation of the
signal. For the n-level decomposition, the original signal S is split as illustrated in
Fig.5.1. The original signal S is decomposed to the first layer A1 and D1 signals.
The similar decomposition process can be applied to the first layer A1 and D1
signal to obtain the second layer that consists of AA2, DA2, AD2 and DD2. In
each layer, every approximation and detail signals will be decomposed to new
approximation and details.
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Figure 5.2: wavelet packet decomposition with 3 levels
To extract the features from the website Tor packet sequences, we use the
wpdec function for For one dimensional data to do wavelet decomposition of our
data. The main signal for the decomposition is represented by the pure Tor
packet sequences for each website visit. Thus, for 20 websites and 15 visits for
each website we will have 300 input data vectors (signals). The length of data
vectors is varied since the number of Tor packet for every website visit are varied.
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Figure 5.3: Signal decomposition using WPD
Since our input will be the sequences of packet sizes of the websites traces,
we applied the 1D wavelet decomposition to extract the low-pass and the high-
pass coefficients of our original signals, which represent the packet size sequence
of the traces, and we investigated different wavelet families to check which of the
wavelet families will provide more informative coefficients to be used for the traces
classification.
One-D wavelet decomposition of our signals implemented using wpdec ( )
function with the following parameters:
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T = Wpdec(Data, ”Level”, ”Wavelet”) (5.1)
Where
T is the wavelet decomposition tree
Data is an array storing the Tor packet sizes instant sample
Level is the level of decomposition (by default it’s 0)
Wavelet is the family of wavelet (e.g. Bior1.5)
Figure 5.4 shows the wavelet and scaling functions( low-pass and high-pass
coefficients) of the Bior1.5 wavelet family. We have mainly used the Bior1.5
wavelet family since it generated the coefficients that provide us the best accuracy
results comparing to the other wavelet family outputs. Meanwhile, we applied
the decomposition up to the fourth level as we figured out that the results of
classification is improved when the next level of the decomposition is taking place.
The detailed results for the all four levels are presented in details in the next
chapter.
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Figure 5.4: Bior1.5 Wavelet and scaling functions
Figure 5.5 shows the values of high-pass low-pass filters or coefficients of bior1.5
wavelet family that are used for convolving the input signal ( Packet sizes se-
quence) with the wavelet family (Bior1.5) for decomposition.
Figure 5.5: Bior1.5 Coefficients
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Then, we extract the a coefficients list from the decomposed wavelet tree using
the following function
C = Wpcoef(T, ”Level”) (5.2)
The function returns the coefficients associated with certain nodes in certain
level. We examine the returned coefficients for different nodes at each level to
train our classifier and we found that the coefficients of the first node at each
level provide the best accuracy results. Figure 5.6 shows a plot graph for website
packet sizes sample whereas the Figure 5.7 shows a plot of extracted coefficients
of the same website packet sizes using WPD in in the 4th level.
Figure 5.6: Plot of packet Sizes for website1 sample1 of Firefox browser
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Figure 5.7: Level 4 WPD bior1.5 coefficients for website1 sample1 of Firefox
browser
5.2 Classifiers
5.2.1 Weka Calssification Tool
WEKA (Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis) is the product of the Uni-
versity of Waikato (New Zealand) [44]. It is a comprehensive collection of machine
learning algorithms that performs data mining tasks such as data preprocessing,
classification, clustering and regression. It is written in the Java language and
provides a GUI to facilitate the interacting with data files and producing visual
results. Weka also allows users to perform different classification algorithms on
their data sets. Weka provides the ability for the users apply the algorithms
directly to a dataset or call them from outsource Java code. In addition, it is
possible to develop new machine learning schemes.
The main GUI for Weka presents as four application interface with different
functions:
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1. Explorer: preprocessing, classifying, clustering, selecting attributes, etc..
2. Experimenter: Setup, Run and analyze the machine learning algorithms.
3. Knowledge Flow: Visual design for KDD process.
4. Simple CLI: a simple command interface.
In this thesis, we only use the Explorer interface which is satisfying our needs
to perform the classification process on our dataset.
WEKA can load ARFF files Attribute Relation File Format. ARFF has two
sections:
1. The Header section defines the relation (dataset) name, attribute name, and
type (the class).
2. The Data section lists the data instances.
Since our preprocessing or feature extraction phase in this thesis work is done
in Matlab program. The output of the feature extracted from Matlab is a CSV
data file format. We convert the data format form CSV to ARFF using the
following steps:
1. Load the CSV file that contains the features data into Weka using preprocess
>>>open file.
2. Save the CSV file to ARFF format.
3. Change the last attribute field in the ARRF file to include the classes to be
classified based on them. See figure 5.8.
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Figure 5.8: Attribute class values in Weka ARFF data file
5.2.2 Support vector machine
Support vector machines (SVMs) is a supervised machine learning that used for
analyzing the data samples and recognizing the patterns among the data. Given
a set of training data labeled with the category that belonged to, a model for
assigning a new data into the corresponding category will be built using SVM
algorithms. The support vector machine builds a hyperplane that separate the two
categories of the data samples. In SVM model, the data samples are represented
as points in space such that the data samples of the same category are separated
from the data samples of the other category by a hyperplane as wide as possible.
The new data samples are predicted to be belonged to one of the categories based
on which side of the gap they fall on.
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Figure 5.9: The support vectors and the margin of the classifier.
Given a set of training data
D = (Xi, yi)|Xi ∈ <p, yi ∈ {−1, 1} (5.3)
The linear discriminant function is given by
f(x) = wT + b (5.4)
where the value of w denotes to the parameter vector and b represents the bias.
The Hyperplane decision surface function of support vector machine gaps the
feature space to two half- spaces.
f(x) = 0 = wT + b (5.5)
56
Giving a training dataset, we say that the training dataset is linearly separable
if :
wTxi + b ≥ 0foryi = +1 (5.6)
wTxi + b ≤ 0foryi = −1 (5.7)




Maximized the hyperplane margin and minimizing the classification error is solved











LD is maximized with respect to a
ai is Lagrange multiplier
yi is the vector class
xi is the train vector
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N is the number of support vectors
si is support vector with classi









Different kernel functions can be used for SVM classification. The kernel
functions map the input vector to a higher dimensional space where a better









The most common functions used by SVM are
Linear Kernel









alpha is the slope
c is a constant term
d polynomial degree
Gaussian Kernel ( example of radial basis function kernel)
k(x, y) = exp
(





A sequential minimal optimization (SMO) is a Support Vector Machine al-
gorithm developed by John Platt which is made for training a support vector
classifier [45]. It implements the sequential minimal optimization algorithm for
training a support vector classifier, using polynomial or Gaussian kernels. SMO
solves the SVM QP (Quadratic Programming), since SVM only classified binary
problems, by decomposing the overall problem into a series of the smallest possible
QP sub-problems. This implementation generally replaces all missing values and
transforms nominal attributes into binary ones. It also normalizes all attributes
by default. Multi-class problems are solved using pairwise classification [45]. In
this work, SMO is evaluated with the following parameters: c = 1.0 and 1024; ep-
silon = 1.0E-12; kernel = PolyKernel; num-Folds = -1; randomSeed = 1. (Default
parameters).
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5.2.3 Multilayer perceptron neural network
Multilayer perceptron neural network (MLP) is an extension of the single layer
perceptron network where the hidden layers will be used beside the input and
output layers for data training. MLP is considered as a feed forward flow network
where input data passing through different layers that consist of neurons. MLPs
neural network model able to learn and predict complicated patterns in data
through finding a set of input weights of the neurons that maximize the fit to
the training data. In feed-forward networks, the output of a neuron has no more
effect on its Input and it is only forward to be input for the next layer. Unlike
the feed-forward networks, the output of neurons in recurrent networks, or called
back-propagation network, are given as their input based on the error difference
of the neuron’s output. In this thesis a feed forward neural network with back-
propagation algorithm was used to classify instances. The aim of using a back-
propagation algorithm is to minimize the output squared error function through
adjusting the input weights of the neurons. The artificial neuron receives one or
more input and sums them to produce an output. The sums of each node are
weighted and activated using a proper activation function (either threshold or
sigmoid function) passed through a nonlinear function known as an activation or
transfer function.
Mathematically, the input to the neuron consists of three main elements: Input
signals, weights and bias. First, a linear combination of the input signals (xi) and





The linear combination in Equation 5.16 with an activation function g will
provide the output of the neuron








The activation functions or transfer functions are usually used to transform
the weighted sum of the inputs to generate the neuron output value. The purpose
of the activation function is to introduce non-linearity to the neural network.
The choice of activation function will have an impact on the performance of the
training algorithm. Nonlinear activation function activation function is widely
used in neural networks. In a backpropagation neural network, the activation
function should be differentiable (non-linear) to be bound in a specific limited
range.
For the backpropagation neural network learning, the most common activation
functions used is the sigmoid. The sigmoid activation function is a bounded
differentiable real function that is defined for all real input values and has a
positive derivative at each point [46].






Figure 5.10: Sigmoid activation function
Figure 5.11: The feed-forward network architecture and perceptron neuron model
5.2.4 Naive bayesian
The Naive Bayesian classifier technique is a probabilistic classifier based on
Bayesian theorem. It is one of the most efficient classification algorithms. It
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supports the independence theorem on the attributes of the classes. It provides
a good results in case of high feature dimensional. Naive Bayes classifier needs a
small amount of training data to determine the parameters (means and variances)
necessary for classification. [47]
Let say that we have the following classes [w1,w2,...,wc], And the Feature
vector is x = [x1, x2,, xd] Then:
The Naive Bayes assumption:




And the Naive Bayes classifier :





The proposed approach can be validated using different classifiers. In this work
experiments, K-Fold cross validation scheme is chosen with 10 folds. In The K-
Fold cross validation model, training data sets is divided into k subsets where
one of these subsets is used for testing while others are used for training. Then,
another different set is chosen for testing each time and the average error rate is
computed among all data sets. The advantage of this model is that each data
instance is used in testing exactly once, and in training k-1 times.
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In machine learning, different classifiers can be used on various datasets to
provide a best results since no single classifier can provide best results on all
problems. The usefulness of the classifier on various datasets can be determined
by evaluating the performance of the classifier on the datasets.
A confusion matrix clarifies the accuracy of the classification problem. Given
N classes which indicate to the websites in this work - a confusion matrix is a
M x N matrix, where Xi,j indicates the number of tuples from data samples that
were assign to class Xij but where the correct class is Xi.
A confusion matrix shows the best classification results whenever the values
outside the diagonal of the matrix are mostly have a zero value which means that
each sample is correctly classified to its corresponding class.
A confusion matrix provides information about real and predicted classifica-
tions produced by the classifier. Number of performance metrics can be derived
from the confusion matrix as follows:
1. Accuracy(AC) :
The accuracy (AC) is the percentage of the total number of predictions
that were correctly classified. AC shows the correctness of the model using
the ratio of total number of correct classifications to overall number of the
classification for a single class.
There are some terms that are commonly used to describe the accuracy met-
ric. These terms are true positive (TP), true negative (TN), false negative
(FN), and false positive (FP).
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Accuracy of the classification model is defined - based on the above terms -
as:
Accuracy =
(TN + TP )
(TN + TP + FN + FP )
(5.21)
Figure 5.12: Sample of classification accuracy for edit distance method on Chrome
dataset
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2. Recall Or TP Rate
Recall or TP rate is the percentage of positive cases that were correctly
classified. Recall or TP rate is a measure of a classification model be able
to select instances of a certain class from a data set [48]. Recall or TP rate
is defined as :




Figure 5.13: TP rate and Recall metrics for chrome dataset classification using
edit distance method
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3. FP Rate The false positive rate (FP) is the percentage of negative samples
that were incorrectly classified as positive. It’s also known as false alarm
rate. FP rate is calculated using the following equation:
FPR =
FP
(TN + FP )
(5.23)
Figure 5.14: FP rate for chrome dataset classification using edit distance method
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4. Precision (P) is the Probability that positive cases are correctly predicted. It




(TP + FP )
(5.24)
Figure 5.15: Classification Precision for edit distance method on chrome dataset
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5. ROC area
In addition to the above metrics, Area under Receiver Operating Character-
istics (ROC) is also considered. In order to decide which classifier is better
than the other, the ROC performance is reduced to a scalar value that rep-
resents the expected performance. A ROC area is a plot of the false positive
rate on the X axis against the true positive rate on the Y axis. It shows
a trade-off between the true positives and false positives predications. The
point (0, 1) in ROC graph shows that the classifier has classified all posi-
tive and negative cases correctly. The point (0, 0) shows that the classifier
predicts all cases as negative unlike the point (1, 1) that shows that the




Extensive experiments were conducted to evaluate the edit distance method and
wavelet method in our generated dataset and Cai dataset. This chapter presents
and analysis the experiments results of the different approaches.
6.1 Datasets
Two different datasets are used in our experiments (Cai dataset and our dataset).
Cai dataset consists of packet traces for (100) websites with (40) samples for
each website [5]. Cai dataset was generated using one web browser (FireFox
Tor version). In our experimentations,(20 websites x 15 visits) samples were used
to regenerate the results of Cai method for classification and investigate other
classifiers on it.
We developed a second database for this research. The developed dataset
Consists of packet traces for (20) websites with (15) samples for each website. We
generated the dataset using six different web browsers (Firefox, Chrome, Safari,
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IE, Opera and Tor browser).
6.2 Feature extraction method and evaluation
We conducted several experiments using cai datasets and our datasets. To stan-
dardize the two datasets, we used the same sample sizes (20 websites x 15 visits)
in our experiments.
6.2.1 Edit Distance - levenshtein distance-
We investigated the edit distance levenshtein distance- feature extraction method
on the two different datasets (Cai dataset and our dataset) with uniform sample
sizes (20 websites x 15 visits) using three different classifiers (SMO, NaiveBayes
and Naivbayesmultinomai) in weka toolbox. We used two different costs for SMO
classifier (1 and 1024) as these costs were used in the SMO classifier in previous
works.
Table 6.1 shows the accuracy rates of the edit distance method using CAI
dataset and our dataset with one sample size (20 websites x 15 visits). It shows
that the Edit Distance -levenshtein distance- with a Naive Bayes classifier has the
highest recognition rate of (92%) on CAI dataset whereas the SMO classifier with
the cost parameter 1, the default cost of SMO, provide the highest recognition
rate of (86%) on our dataset specifically on Firefox browser.
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Tor FireFox Browser
Classifier/Browser FireFox IE Chrome Opera Safari Tor Cai Data
SMO-c1 81.00% 86.00% 82.00% 75.00% 72.00% 79.00% 86.00%
SMO-c1024 80.00% 84.00% 80.00% 75.00% 67.00% 72.00% 83.00%
Naive Bayes 79.00% 86.00% 78.00% 61.00% 70.00% 76.00% 92.00%
Naivbayesmultinomai 53.00% 62.00% 45.00% 44.00% 44.00% 44.00% 58.00%
Table 6.1: websites recognition accuracy of Edit distance method with different
classifiers on Cai dataset
Figure 6.1: Graphical presentation of website fingerprinting using Edit distance
method on Cai and our datasets
We conducted the same edit distance Levenshtein distance- feature extraction
method on our generated dataset for every web browser using three sample sizes
(10 websites x 10 visits), (20 websites x 15 visits) and (20 websites x 20 visits)
and three classifiers as we did in the previous experiment.
Tables 6.2 - 6.7 show the accuracy rates for edit distance feature extraction
method on the Chrome, Firebox, IE, Opera, Safari and Tor browsers datasets
respectively. They show that SVM classifier with cost 1 provide the best
recognition rate of (82%) (81%) (86%) (75%) (72%) (79%) using (20 websites
x 15 visits). Nave Bayes classifier provides best results for the safari and tor
browsers with sample size (10 websites x 10 visits).
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Chrome Browser
Sampe Size/Classifier SMO-c1 SMO-c1024 NaiveBayes Naivbayesmultinomail
10 x 10 79.00% 68.00% 81.00% 69.00%
20 x 20 74.00% 70.00% 64.00% 45.00%
20 x 15 82.00% 80.00% 78.00% 45.00%
Table 6.2: websites recognition accuracy of Edit distance method with different
classifiers on the Chrome Browser
Figure 6.2: Graphical presentation of website fingerprinting using Edit Distance
method for Chrome Browser.
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FireFox browser Browser
Sampe Size/Classifier SMO-c1 SMO-c1024 NaiveBayes Naivbayesmultinomail
10 x 10 78.00% 75.00% 77.00% 72.00%
20 x 20 75.00% 73.00% 68.00% 51.00%
20 x 15 81.00% 80.00% 79.00% 53.00%
Table 6.3: websites recognition accuracy of Edit distance method with different
classifiers on Firefox Browser
Figure 6.3: Graphical presentation of website fingerprinting using Edit Distance
method for FireFox Browser.
74
IE Browser
Sample Size/Classifier SMO-c1 SMO-c1024 NaiveBayes Naivbayesmultinomail
10 x 10 86.00% 85.00% 86.00% 74.00%
20 x 20 79.00% 76.00% 73.00% 55.00%
20 x 15 86.00% 84.00% 86.00% 62.00%
Table 6.4: websites recognition accuracy of Edit distance method with different
classifiers on IE Browser
Figure 6.4: Graphical presentation of website fingerprinting using Edit Distance
method for IE Browser.
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Opera Browser
Sampe Size/Classifier SMO-c1 SMO-c1024 NaiveBayes Naivbayesmultinomail
10 x 10 75.00% 64.00% 67.00% 60.00%
20 x 20 72.00% 69.00% 50.00% 21.00%
20 x 15 75.00% 75.00% 61.00% 44.00%
Table 6.5: websites recognition accuracy of Edit distance method with different
classifiers on Opera Browser
Figure 6.5: Graphical presentation of website fingerprinting using Edit Distance
method for Opera Browser.
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Safari Browser
Sampe Size/Classifier SMO-c1 SMO-c1024 NaiveBayes Naivbayesmultinomail
10 x 10 81.00% 73.00% 86.00% 80.00%
20 x 20 67.00% 63.00% 63.00% 44.00%
20 x 15 72.00% 67.00% 70.00% 44.00%
Table 6.6: websites recognition accuracy of Edit distance method with different
classifiers on Safari Browser
Figure 6.6: Graphical presentation of website fingerprinting using Edit Distance
method for Safari Browser.
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Tor Browser
Sampe Size/Classifier SMO-c1 SMO-c1024 NaiveBayes Naivbayesmultinomail
10 x 10 79.00% 74.00% 87.00% 74.00%
20 x 20 79.00% 72.00% 76.00% 44.00%
20 x 15 79.00% 72.00% 76.00% 44.00%
Table 6.7: websites recognition accuracy of Edit distance method with different
classifiers on Tor Browser
Figure 6.7: Graphical presentation of website fingerprinting using Edit Distance
method for Tor Browser.
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Using SVM classifier with Edit distance method, the best results for the ac-
curacy rates that we have obtained in terms of the Accuracy rate, TP Rate, FP
Rate, Precision, Recall and ROC metrics were for the IE browser, Chrome browser
and Firefox browser datasets respectively. The highest Accuracy rate achieved is
86.33% for IE browser and the lowest rate obtained is 72% for the Safari browser.
Table 6.2.1 shows the experimental results in terms of TP Rate, FP Rate, Preci-
sion, Recall and ROC for the six selected web browsers.
Results: Edit distance with SVM Classifier
Browser FireFox Chrome Safari Opera IE Tor
Accuracy Rate 10 Folds 81.33 % 82.00% 72.00 % 75.33 % 86.33 % 78.67%
TP Rate 0.813 0.820 0.72 0.753 0.863 0.787
FP Rate 0.01 0.009 0.015 0.013 0.007 0.011
Precision 0.828 0.850 0.766 0.766 0.882 0.781
Recall 0.813 0.820 0.72 0.753 0.863 0.787
ROC 0.919 0.944 0.931 0.941 0.958 0.951
captionCross validation perfomance metrics for Edit distance method on our
dataset
Figure 6.8: Performance metrics for ED+ SVM classification algorithm
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Then we applied another classifier called MultilayerPerceptron with our fea-
tures extracted by the edit distance method for the all data browsers. Table 6.8
shows the results of the MultilayerPerceptron classifier on features extracted by
edit distance method.
Results: Edit distance with MultilayerPerceptron Classifier
Browser FireFox Chrome Safari Opera IE Tor
Accuracy Rate 10 Folds 81.333 % 82.667% 70.667% 77.000% 87.667% 76.333%
TP Rate 0.813 0.827 0.707 0.770 0.877 0.763
FP Rate 0.01 0.009 0.015 0.012 0.006 0.012
Precision 0.824 0.844 0.725 0.779 0.888 0.749
Recall 0.813 0.827 0.707 0.770 0.877 0.763
ROC 0.954 0.972 0.941 0.962 0.975 0.957
Table 6.8: Performance metrics for Edit distance method + MultilayerPerceptron
Figure 6.9: Performance metrics for ED + MultilayerPerceptron classifier
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6.2.2 Wavelet Packet Decomposition
In our experiments, we investigated wavelet packet decomposition as feature ex-
traction method for the website packets traces. We conducted our experiments
on our datasets and Cai datasets. Since there are certain numbers of mother
wavelets, we have investigated the main three types of the mother wavelet (Haar,
Sym2, and Bior1.5) [49, 50, 51, 52, 53]. Table 6.9 shows the results of WPD
for the fourth level of decomposition using the three mentioned wavelet families
(Haar, Sym2, and Bior1.5). As a result, we find that the Bior1.5 provides the
best accuracy rate compared to other investigated wavelet packet decomposition
families which means that our main signals that represented the websites traces
is quite identical or similar to the signal shape of the mother wavelet Bior1.5. on
the other word, the low-pass and high-pass coefficients can be integrated with our
main signals and produce new readable signals that can be easy detect the high
and low frequency of our main signals-website packet size traces- . Figure 6.13
shows the accuracy rate for different wavelet families using WPD in our generated
dataset and Cai dataset.
WPD fourth level results for different wavelet families
Browser FireFox Chrome Safari Opera IE Tor Cai Data
Bior1.5 79.666 % 70.333% 59.333% 49.666% 78.667% 68.000% 79.333%
Haar 78.667 % 67.333% 56% 45% 75.666% 64.666% 79.667
SYM2 78.333 % 69.333% 58% 42.333% 76.333% 61% 79.667%
Table 6.9: WPD families Results
Figures 6.10,6.11 and 6.12 show the plot of the main signal ( the packet sizes
sequence) with the low and high coefficients ( filters) of the used wavelet families.
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Figure 6.10: Sample of chrome trace with the low and high-pass coefficients of
Haar wavelet
Figure 6.11: Sample of chrome trace with the low and high-pass coefficients of
Sym2 wavelet
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Figure 6.12: Sample of chrome trace with the low and high-pass coefficients of
Bior1.5 wavelet
Figure 6.13: Accuracy rate for the website fingerprinting using different WPD
families
Then extensive experiments have been conducted to investigate the best accu-
racy rate for bior1.5 wavelet packet decomposition. We used our generated dataset
with (20 websites x 15 visits) samples for six browsers beside to Cai dataset. The
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website classes labeled by numbers due to the data file format requirement in
Weka toolbox (See appendix for more details for website classs name). We have
used four levels of wavelet packet decomposition to investigate how the accuracy
improved at each level and to determine some metrics of the improvements. The
results for every WPD level on our dataset and Cai dataset using SVM classi-
fier(with SMO classification algorithm) are shown in the following part.
1. Wavelet Packet Decomposition Level 1 results :
Results: Wavelet Packet Decomposition Bior1.5 on Level1
Browser FireFox Chrome Safari Opera IE Tor Cai Data
Accuracy 69.333% 46.00% 47.667% 30.333% 57.333% 38.333% 67.667%
TP Rate 0.693 0.460 0.447 0.303 0.573 0.383 0.667
FP Rate 0.016 0.028 0.028 0.037 0.22 0.032 0.017
Precision 0.767 0.867 0.570 0.484 0.641 0.575 0.735
Recall 0.693 0.584 0.477 0.303 0.573 0.383 0.667
ROC 0.949 0.873 0.883 0.818 0.937 0.857 0.956
Table 6.10: Cross validation performance metrics for Wavelet Bior1.5 method on
our dataset
2. Wavelet Packet Decomposition Level 2 results :
Results: Wavelet Packet Decomposition Bior1.5 on Level2
Browser FireFox Chrome Safari Opera IE Tor Cai Data
Accuracy 69.333 % 59.667% 53.000 % 39.333% 67.000% 46.667% 72.000%
TP Rate 0.693 0.597 0.530 0.393 0.670 0.467 0.720
FP Rate 0.016 0.021 0.025 0.032 0.017 0.028 0.015
Precision 0.767 0.684 0.609 0.481 0.704 0.580 0.760
Recall 0.693 0.597 0.530 0.393 0.670 0.467 0.720
ROC 0.949 900 0.905 0.838 0.947 0.887 0.962
Table 6.11: Cross validation performance metrics for Wavelet Bior1.5 method on
our dataset
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3. Wavelet Packet Decomposition Level 3 results :
Results: Wavelet Packet Decomposition Bior1.5 on Level 3
Browser FireFox Chrome Safari Opera IE Tor Cai Data
Accuracy 74% 68.00% 59.667 % 46.667% 74.667% 61.667% 74.333%
TP Rate 0.740 0.680 0.597 0.467 0.747 0.617 0.743
FP Rate 0.014 0.017 0.021 0.028 0.013 0.020 0.14
Precision 0.798 0.722 0.663 0.473 0.737 0.672 0.762
Recall 0.740 0.680 0.597 0.467 0.747 0.617 743
ROC 0.951 0.920 0.912 0.859 0.951 0.911 0.964
Table 6.12: Cross validation performance metrics for Wavelet Bior1.5 method on
our dataset
4. Wavelet Packet Decomposition Level 4 results :
Results: Wavelet Packet Decomposition Bior1.5 on Level 4
Browser FireFox Chrome Safari Opera IE Tor Cai Data
Accuracy 79.666% 70.333% 59.667% 49.666% 78.667% 68.000% 79.333%
TP Rate 0.797 0.703 0.597 0.497 0.787 0.680 0.793
FP Rate 0.011 0.016 0.021 0.026 0.011 0.017 0.011
Precision 0.836 0.732 0.663 0.539 0.799 0.692 0.811
Recall 0.797 0.703 0.597 0.497 0.787 0.680 0.793
ROC 0.958 0.933 0.912 0.882 0.954 0.931 0.959
Table 6.13: Cross validation performance metrics for Wavelet Bior1.5 method on
our dataset
Then we have used the MultilayerPerceptron classifier on the Wavelet data
features for all selected browsers and Cai dataset. Using the MultilayerPercep-
tron classifier, we have applied the wavelet packet decomposition features of the
datasets for the 4th level of the WPD of all browser data. The table 6.14 shows
the results of applying the MultilayerPerceptron classifier for the level 4 of the
WPD of the datasets.
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Results: Wavelet Packet Decomposition Bior1.5 on Level 4+ MultilayerPerceptron classifier
Browser Firefox Chrome Safari Opera IE Tor Cai Data
Accuracy 78.333% 75.000% 59.667 % 45.000% 82.000% 72.667% 78.000%
TP Rate 0.783 0.750 0.597 0.450 0.820 0.727 0.780
FP Rate 0.011 0.013 0.021 0.029 0.009 0.014 0.012
Precision 0.795 0.754 0.663 0.459 0.830 0.723 0.788
Recall 0.783 0.750 0.597 0.450 0.820 0.723 0.780
ROC 0.961 0.960 0.912 0.873 0.965 0.951 0.954
Table 6.14: Performance metrics for Wavelet Bior1.5 + MultilayerPerceptron
Figure 6.14: Performance metrics for WPD+ MultilayerPerceptron classifier
Although MLP classifier increases the classification accuracy rate for Internet
explorer, Chrome, Safari and Tor datasets against the SVM classifier, the time
required to build a model using MLP classifier is significantly higher than the time
required to build the SVM classifier. Fig. 6.15 shows the time required to build
the model using the two investigated classifiers for the six web browsers datasets.
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In this work we examined different approaches for website fingerprinting on
Tor protocol. We collected a dataset of website traffic using six web browsers
(Firefox, Chrome, Internet Explorer, Opera, Safari and Tor) with 20 websites and
15 samples. We presented the stages and phases of designing our dataset starting
by describing the environment set up for data collection and the tools that were
used to collect the data. We also described the second phase and stage for
designing the dataset which is the data processing phase. It describes in details
how we filtered, identified and extracted the data from the raw packet data
to build our final format dataset to be used in our experiment (feature extraction).
To validate our generated dataset for website fingerprinting, we implemented
edit distance feature extraction method which was used in recent research works
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for website fingerprinting. We achieved accuracy results of 86% on dataset
generated by IE browser using SMO algorithm for classification. Accuracy rate of
88% was achieved on dataset generated by IE browser using MultilayerPerceptron
classifier. We used dataset of 20 websites and 15 samples in our experiments.
Then we introduced a new feature extraction method based on wavelet
transform technique. We used wavelet packet decomposition method to extract
feature vectors from the Tor packet size sequence for the websites. Since there are
a number of wavelet families that can be applied to perform the transformation
and decomposition, we investigated three main wavelet families on our generated
dataset to determine which of them can be used further based on the obtained
accuracy results. Based on the wavelet families experimental results, we choose to
use Bior1.5 wavelet for the WPD experiments in certain levels. We investigated
different levels of WPD to show how the accuracy improved through the levels of
WPD. For the 4th level of WPD for out Tor packet size sequence, we achieved an
accuracy rate of 82% on IE dataset using MultilayerPerceptron classifier and 80%
on Firefox dataset using SMO classifier. We used other performance metrics (TP
rate, FP rate, Precision, Recall and ROC) to evaluate and validate our approach
on our generated dataset.
Although the obtained results of applying the new feature extraction method
(WPD) are not quite perfect, they give a good indication that wavelet technique
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is suitable for website fingerprinting if we improve the preprocessing phase of the
data collection.
7.2 Limitations of the Current Work
There were several limitations to our work summarized as follows:
Firstly, we have built our approach based on closed-world dataset not on open-
world data set. In closed-world dataset classification, the set of classes (websites,
identities) is known in advance. This type of classification is known as super-
vised classification. Open-world classification deals with scenarios in which the
set of classes is not known in advance. In Open-world classification problem, the
classifier should be able to first detect the pattern among all websites traces (un-
supervised learning since no label for websites traces are available during building
the model) and second classify the corresponding websites.
Secondly, our proposed approach is not suitable if the extracted packet size
sequence has a lot of noise (sizes of packet that are not belong to Tor traffic).
Using wavelet packet decomposition as a feature extraction requires the data signal
(packet size sequence) to has a clear pattern in order to extract the features. This
implies that the preprocessing phase is the main factor in the WPD approach to
be successful.
Thirdly, our approach is working based on extracting coefficients features from
the packet size sequences of the traces. It’s hard to classify website traces using
WPD for combined features of the website traces (packet size, inter-arrival packet
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time, etc...) since the WPD extracted coefficients rely on the frequencies of packet
size not on combined elements.
Finally, packet size values of the website traces are very important for applying
WPD to extract the coefficients for the packet size traces. Since the size of data
unit sent through the tor network is fixed (512 bytes), the website trace will
almost contain the packet size of (512, 1024, 2048) values with plus-minus sign
() indicating whether the packet is incoming or outgoing. These values will be
repeated frequently, which in turn represent the trace packet sizes sequence in the
format that allows WDP to extract more informative coefficients for classification.
That means, our approach of WPD is not suitable if the packet sequence contains
more variable values.
7.3 Future Work
Our research work can be extended to four main directions in the future:
• The aim of applying our proposed method in closed-world is to evaluate the
ability of the classification method (feature extraction method + classifier
used) to distinguish between the visited websites and to be used as a basis
for comparison with the other proposed works in the field. For the realistic
classification results, open world dataset can be used to evaluate the Wavelet
packet decomposition approach for website fingerprinting.
• Traffic flow features are important to the classification problem, and different
features may result in different classification results. Therefore, combining
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statistical feature of the traffic flow with the packet size of traces will have
a positive in the classification results.
• Since we obtained the best results of the websites classification using WPD
method with back-propagation (BP) neural network classifier in our work,
BP neural network can be optimized using specific optimization algorithms
such as Particle swarm optimization (PSO) in order to increase the classifi-
cation performance.
• Applying our proposed method to fingerprint a traffic of web services. This
should have a high value in the anonymity systems literature since it will
accurately indicate the impact of using web services on the anonymity of
users (how much anonymity is lost when using web services).
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APPENDIX B : Detailed Performance Metrics For SVM classifier and
WPD method
1. Chrome browser
(a) WPD 1st level
Figure B.1: Accuracy of WPD first level for chrome browser
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Figure B.2: Confusion matrix of WPD first level for chrome browser
(b) WPD 2nd level
Figure B.3: Accuracy of WPD second level for chrome browser
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Figure B.4: Confusion matrix of WPD second level for chrome browser
(c) WPD 3rd level
Figure B.5: Accuracy of WPD third level for chrome browser
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Figure B.6: Confusion matrix of WPD third level for chrome browser
(d) WPD 4th level
Figure B.7: Accuracy of WPD fourth level for chrome browser
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Figure B.8: Confusion matrix of WPD fourth level for chrome browser
2. Firefox browser
(a) WPD 1st level
Figure B.9: Accuracy of WPD first level for Firefox browser
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Figure B.10: Confusion matrix of WPD first level for Firefox browser
(b) WPD 2nd level
Figure B.11: Accuracy of WPD second level for Firefox browser
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Figure B.12: Confusion matrix of WPD second level for Firefox browser
(c) WPD 3rd level
Figure B.13: Accuracy of WPD third level for Firefox browser
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Figure B.14: Confusion matrix of WPD third level for Firefox browser
(d) WPD 4th level
Figure B.15: Accuracy of WPD fourth level for Firefox browser
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Figure B.16: Confusion matrix of WPD fourth level for Firefox browser
3. Safari browser
(a) WPD 1st level
Figure B.17: Accuracy of WPD first level for safari browser
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Figure B.18: Confusion matrix of WPD first level for safari browser
(b) WPD 2nd level
Figure B.19: Accuracy of WPD second level for safari browser
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Figure B.20: Confusion matrix of WPD second level for safari browser
(c) WPD 3rd level
Figure B.21: Accuracy of WPD third level for safari browser
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Figure B.22: Confusion matrix of WPD third level for safari browser
(d) WPD 4th level
Figure B.23: Accuracy of WPD fourth level for safari browser
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Figure B.24: Confusion matrix of WPD fourth level for safari browser
4. IE browser
(a) WPD 1st level
Figure B.25: Accuracy of WPD first level for IE browser
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Figure B.26: Confusion matrix of WPD first level for IE browser
(b) WPD 2nd level
Figure B.27: Accuracy of WPD second level for IE browser
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Figure B.28: Confusion matrix of WPD second level for IE browser
(c) WPD 3rd level
Figure B.29: Accuracy of WPD third level for IE browser
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Figure B.30: Confusion matrix of WPD third level for IE browser
(d) WPD 4th level
Figure B.31: Accuracy of WPD fourth level for IE browser
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Figure B.32: Confusion matrix of WPD fourth level for IE browser
5. Opera browser
(a) WPD 1st level
Figure B.33: Accuracy of WPD first level for opera browser
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Figure B.34: Confusion matrix of WPD first level for opera browser
(b) WPD 2nd level
Figure B.35: Accuracy of WPD second level for opera browser
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Figure B.36: Confusion matrix of WPD second level for opera browser
(c) WPD 3rd level
Figure B.37: Accuracy of WPD third level for opera browser
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Figure B.38: Confusion matrix of WPD third level for opera browser
(d) WPD 4th level
Figure B.39: Accuracy of WPD fourth level for opera browser
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Figure B.40: Confusion matrix of WPD fourth level for opera browser
6. Tor browser
(a) WPD 1st level
Figure B.41: Accuracy of WPD first level for tor browser
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Figure B.42: Confusion matrix of WPD first level for tor browser
(b) WPD 2nd level
Figure B.43: Accuracy of WPD second level for tor browser
124
Figure B.44: Confusion matrix of WPD second level for tor browser
(c) WPD 3rd level
Figure B.45: Accuracy of WPD third level for tor browser
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Figure B.46: Confusion matrix of WPD third level for tor browser
(d) WPD 4th level
Figure B.47: Accuracy of WPD fourth level for tor browser
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Figure B.48: Confusion matrix of WPD fourth level for tor browser
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APPENDIX C : Detailed Performance Metrics For MLP classifier and
WPD method
1. Chrome browser
Figure C.1: Accuracy of WPD for chrome browser
Figure C.2: Confusion matrix of WPD for chrome browser
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2. Firefox browser
Figure C.3: Accuracy of WPD for Firefox browser
Figure C.4: Confusion matrix of WPD for Firefox browser
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3. IE browser
Figure C.5: Accuracy of WPD for IE browser
Figure C.6: Confusion matrix of WPD for IE browser
130
4. Opera browser
Figure C.7: Accuracy of WPD for Opera browser
Figure C.8: Confusion matrix of WPD for Opera browser
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5. Tor browser
Figure C.9: Accuracy of WPD for Tor browser




Name : Majdi Saeed Mohammed Bin Salman 
Nationality : Yemeni 
Date of Birth : 02/11/1980 
 Email  : msbsalman@gmail.com 
Address : Yemen- Mukalla – Hadramout 
Academic Background 
 Received Bachelor degree in Computer Science from Al-Ahgaff University, Yemen in
2004 with a GPA of 4.06/5.
 Joined Yemeni Fish Company in Yemen as IT supervisor from 2004-2010.
 Joint the Information and Computer science dept as full time student at King Fahd
University of Petroleum and Minerals (KFUPM), Dhahran, Saudi Arabia in September
2010.  
 Complete Master in Computer Science, King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals,
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia with a GPA of 3.30/4.
Publications 
1. “Using SMCD to Develop Consistent Misuse Case Models: An Industrial Case Study”,
M. El-Attar, M. S. Bin Salman, 21st International Conference on Software Engineering
and Data Engineering (SEDE’12), Los Angeles, USA. 2012.
2. "Fingerprinting Tor Protocol through Wavelet Packet Decomposition", Majdi Saeed Bin
Salman, Sami Zhioua, Md. Rafiul Hassan, Fist International Conference on Anti-
Cybercrimes (ICACC),Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. 2015.
